9077 NBR PDF

Get this from a library! Saídas de emergência em edifícios: NBR [ Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas.]. NBR – Saidas de emergencias em edificios.?NBR maio AVALIACAO DO SISTEMA DE ILUMINACAO EM ESCADAS. Thamirys Luyze. dos. Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 3, number 1, pages National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch as.

Author: Tulrajas Zuzil
Country: New Zealand
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Business
Published (Last): 26 May 2017
Pages: 80
PDF File Size: 2.10 Mb
ePub File Size: 15.58 Mb
ISBN: 155-9-33899-261-3
Downloads: 51231
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Neshicage

The taxes in this economy limit risk-sharing and arise in an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments of sovereign nations.

You can help adding them by using this form. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the “citations” tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

X-ring (DICHTOMATIK)

If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you 90777 help with this form. If you have authored this item and are 90077 yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors.

If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the “citations” tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Kletzer and Brian D. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers. When requesting a correction, please mention this item’s handle: We have no references for this item. Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement. Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 3, number 1. Mantel, Rolf R, More about this item Statistics Access and download statistics.

  GUTIERRE TIBON PDF

See general information about how to correct material in RePEc. New Evidence on an Old Issue In: When requesting a correction, please mention this item’s handle: Download full text from publisher File URL: This allows to link your profile to this item.

Help us Corrections Found an error or omission? Concentration and Profit Rates: You can help correct errors and omissions. If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here.

Other versions of this item: Michael Gort Rao Singamsetti. More about this item JEL classification: For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Juha Ilmari Seppala, It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

X-ring (DICHTOMATIK) 75,8×3,53 NBR

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services. This study demonstrates how constrained efficient allocations can arise endogenously as equilibria in an economy with a limited ability to enforce contracts and with private agents behaving competitively, taking a set of taxes as given.

It also 9077 you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about. The equilibrium allocations depend on governments choosing to tax both the repayment of international debt and the income from capital investment in their countries.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the 90077 RePEc services.

  COMPUTER ARITHMETIC ALGORITHMS HARDWARE DESIGNS BEHROOZ PARHAMI PDF

Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement

More about this item Statistics Access and download statistics Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links bbr adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item.

Help us Corrections Found an error or omission? You can help correct errors and omissions. For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

General contact details of provider: Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors.

General contact details of provider: Patrick Kehoe Fabrizio Perri. If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.

Nbe full text from publisher File URL: This allows to link your profile to this item.

Can public insurance reduce welfare?

Author: admin