This manual is part of the FM series, which describes a contemporary. Opposing Force (OPFOR) that exists for the purpose of training U.S. forces. publications in the former Field Manual [FM] series will be TCs outline an OPFOR than can cover the entire spectrum of military and. First, the armor- and mechanized-based and infantry-based OPFOR modules . Likewise, some types of OPFOR described in FM can.

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This menu of possible forces allows U. Thus, vehicles of similar type, speed, and cross-country capability may move together in packets rather than mixed with other vehicles as they are when prepared for combined arms combat. Road marches with or without combination with rail marches result in opfof more rapid concentration than pure rail moves, especially for distances under km.

The primary goal of information warfare IW activities during the march is to minimize the enemy’s ability to collect information and analyze the OPFOR’s force structure, movement, and objectives.

File:FM 7-100.1 – OPFOR, Opposing Force Operations (December 2004).pdf

They typically use these heavier units as exploitation forces or mobile reserves. This dispersion reduces vulnerability to enemy attack and also increases the area covered by responsive fire support. They may be part of or sponsored by a large-scale drug or criminal organization, or they may have the backing of a wealthy outside power. The events list drives the conduct and tempo of the scenario. Second echelons and CPs normally move on the main axis at either level.

However, users other than trainers also may apply the information in these manuals when they need an unclassified threat force that is not country-specific. If the OPFOR anticipates a meeting engagement battlean attack against an ill-prepared or overextended enemy, or a pursuit, the first echelon is normally tank-heavy at both tactical and operational levels, and forward detachments can probe ahead.

For the same reason, it is desirable to have three routes per first-echelon division in the march from the final assembly area to the line of commitment to the tactical area. Once in the combat zone, the OPFOR deploys stronger march security, especially on any open or threatened flank.


Rather than standing organizations with predictable structures, most of their military organizations are ad hoc. Physical destruction missions targeting command and control and reconnaissance assets are critical to ensuring the enemy does not disrupt or delay movement. Sign In Sign Out. If not, the infantry-based forces of FM may better fit training needs. However, such a force is exceedingly expensive to equip, train, and maintain. At both operational and tactical levels, antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments MODs, see Chapter 12 move on a threatened flank or forward within the main body and to be ready to deploy to either flank.

Significant technologies that mark this class are in fire support and target acquisition.

On modern lines, a rail march can achieve from to 1, km per day including loading and unloading times, which may amount to over 50 percent of the total. A second-echelon division on three routes is about 80 km deep. Shortened timelines resulting from closure with the enemy do not allow for this in most cases.

First, the armor- and mechanized-based and infantry-based OPFOR modules are not simply unclassified handbooks on the armed forces of a particular nation. As the Army moves into the twenty-first century, it is no longer possible to identify one or two nations or forces as the potential adversaries against which it needs to train on a regular basis.

Intervals between brigades grow from 5 to 10 km, with about 5 km between battalions. This means that a unit on the march must always have at least one CP deployed and in control. When planning combined rail and road marches, planners must closely coordinate the movement of heavy equipment by rail with road columns.

They may be dispersed in smaller groupings throughout a march column. The successful execution of a march depends on several support measures. OPFOR standards do not require traffic control posts if the march route is less than km long. Thus, the total length of an army’s columns marching in seven routes may be about km.

In the case of intervention by an external power or coalition, this strategy aims to undermine the enemy’s will to continue the conflict without the necessity of defeating his main forces on the battlefield. The scenario should also include, among other things: If one side opts for the strategic defensive and wins the race, it can face the enemy with a dense defense in prepared positions, backed by strong operational reserves.


This can help to beat the enemy to the punch in a meeting engagement and to surprise a defending kpfor through the speed with which the OPFOR can mount an attack. Medium and large infantry-based forces may also possess significant armor- and mechanized-based formations. Such a spacing would allow for any necessary maneuver or dispersion, yet ensures timely commitment. Large armor- and mechanized-based forces often have more sophisticated weaponry.

FM Armor- And Mechanized-Based Opposing Force Operational Art – Inroduction

Army, is the Ground Forces. These forces normally have a complex structure, with more specialized units operating highly sophisticated equipment. This could be any advanced technology or system possessed by a militarily significant country, including western or developing countries.

The problem is most acute in the case of tanks and, to a lesser extent, self-propelled artillery and infantry combat vehicles. When conflict is imminent, or when U. Field Manual depicts the forces of a developed country that devotes extensive resources to maintaining a military capability that rivals that of the United States. None of these forces is capable of meeting the most advanced armies on an even footing in conventional battle.

Figures and show the norms for the average speed of OPFOR columns and their expected daily performance. These forces o;for comprise It constitutes a baseline for training or developing U. Large armor- and mechanized-based forces can conduct large-scale, combined arms operations.

The operational art describes how army groups, armies, and corps conduct operations. There are two methods for ensuring this. The OPFOR is keenly aware of the importance of tempo and the likelihood of meeting engagements battles on the modern battlefield.

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